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Introduction
In this paper, I explore anthropological interpretations of myths. Myths 
have fascinated scholars in various disciplines -  as well as ordinary people. 
They have recorded and presented history, expounded philosophical ideas 
and moral values (Plato, Sophocles, Aeschylus), as well as provided 
patterns for interpreting language, (Müller), psychology (Freud, Rank, Jung) 
and structure (Lévi-Strauss, Greimas). One of the more puzzling moments 
in all these studies was the apparent incommensurability between “myth” 
and “reality.” How could something as vague or fantastic as a myth be
1. Acknowledgments: This is an extended and thoroughly revised version o f the paper 
presented at the W illiam Robertson Smith Congress at King’s College, University o f 
Aberdeen, on 8 April 1994 (Boskovic, 1995b). I am very grateful to Professor William 
Johnstone (University o f Aberdeen) for clarifying some biographical points on W. R. 
Smith, and to Professor Mariza G. S. Peirano (Universidade de Brasilia) for suggesting 
some interesting additions (like the Shelley and Thaggard article). Different versions o f the 
paper were presented over the course o f years at the Universities o f Brasilia (Brazil, 
1999), Witwatersrand (South Africa, 2001), Ljubljana (Slovenia -  at the School for Social 
Work and the Department o f Ethnology in 1998, at the Faculty o f Social Sciences in 1998 
and 2001), and at the Center for Contemporary Arts (CSUB) in Belgrade (Yugoslavia, 
2002). Last but not least, many thanks to my friend Henyo Trindade Barretto Filho (Uni­
versidade de Brasilia) for his patience and perseverance.
Anuírio Antropológico/99: 103-144 
Rio de Janeiro: Tempo Brasileiro, 2002
103
ALEKSANDAR BOSKOVIC
regarded as “real”? At the same time, it was exactly the work of anthropo­
logists (like Malinowski, for example) that provided for some alternative 
models of understanding of other peoples, other cultures, and other myths. 
Of course, it all had to come from somewhere, and I trace the beginning of 
the anthropological study o f myth to the 19th century Scottish Semitist and 
Biblical scholar, William Robertson Smith. In this paper I will show the 
influence of William Robertson Smith’s concept o f myth and ritual to the 
anthropological study of myth. Smith was the first scholar to concern him­
se lf w ith the relationship of myth and ritual -  and in doing so he 
influenced generations of anthropologists. However, his influence was not 
always obvious or direct. For example, his concept of the primacy of ritual 
over myth was developed from the concept of religion as a social fact, 
which influenced Durkheim. It was through Durkheim that this concept 
made its way to subsequent scholarship. 1 will show the extent o f  some of 
Smith’s ideas that were present in the works of some of the most prominent 
anthropologists (and, through their work, made their way into the theories 
o f Cassirer and Langer). Paradoxically, myth figured much more promi­
nently in the work of earlier anthropologists like Edward Tylor (1871), but 
lost importance in the subsequent anthropological literature. I believe that 
Smith was indirectly responsible for this decline in prominence.
My choice of scholars and their theories is quite subjective and open to 
criticism, although I believe that most people would agree that F. Max 
Müller is representative of the philological approaches to the study of myth, 
Ernst Cassirer and Susanne K.. Langer for the philosophical ones, Joseph 
Campbell for the approaches based on psychology, and Mircea Eliade for 
the ones based on the history o f religions. The same is true for the 
influence of Franz Boas, Bronislaw Malinowski, Clyde Kluckhohn, Edmund 
Leach and Claude Lévi-Strauss in anthropology. I believe that the extent of 
their influence, as well as their importance in the history of anthropology, is 
beyond any doubt.
William Robertson Smith is considered to be the founder of the “Myth 
and Ritual school” -  although the approach really took off with Frazer’s 
Golden Bough (cf. Segal, 1999: 37-41). This approach is still present in the 
anthropological research. It offers interesting insights, but also has serious 
limitations. I am primarily interested in the exploration of possibilities for 
overcoming these limitations, as well as looking into the ways that other 
anthropologists have been dealing with myth. Treating myths as “traditional
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tales” (Kirk, 1970 and 1974), I argue that understanding them as narratives 
can offer important insights. However, before venturing into Smith’s works,
I will briefly discuss the meaning and the concept o f myth,2 as well as 
some influential theories on its interpretation outside anthropology. After 
giving an outline of Smith’s life, I will examine his relevant works, as well 
as the different directions in which the anthropological study of myth has 
been moving in the century since the publication of the first edition of the 
Lectures on the Religion o f  the Semites (1894).
Myths have been studied by anthropologists from the beginnings of the 
discipline (“mythology” is included in the very title o f Tylor, 1871; cf. also 
Rapport and Overing, 2000: 274-275). In most cases, anthropologists have 
been reluctant to devote their studies exclusively to myth (among notable 
exceptions were Boas and Lévi-Strauss), preferring to incorporate it within 
“customs” or “beliefs” of the peoples they have been studying. Joanna 
Overing notes that in British anthropology in particular, the value of the 
contents o f myth has persistently been ignored or denied (Rapport and 
Overing, 2000: 276). My stress on some of the authors and concepts from 
late 19th and early 20th century is also meant to show the degrees of conti­
nuities between different theories and methodologies -  for example, there 
are big similarities in the comparative approaches advocated by Frazer and 
Lévi-Strauss -  a fact that many scholars tend to overlook.
The crucial concept introduced by anthropologists in the study of myth is 
the concept of ritual, and it is this concept and the related studies of it that 
were fundamentally influenced by the work of William Robertson Smith 
(1846-1894). Although respected and studied,3 Smith still lacks full recog­
2. This brief introduction will be concerned only with the explanations o f the Western scho­
lars, despite the fact that some of the authors mentioned here were strongly influenced by 
the Eastern religions (Campbell, 1959-1970; Eliade; 1974) or did significant works related 
to specific Eastern (Asian) religions (O ’Flaherty, 1975). I believe that the fact that the 
word “m yth” and its related meanings are particular to the Western cultural traditions 
justifies this limitation. On the other hand, a survey o f the non-Westem concepts and ideas 
on myth would be more than welcome. Lincoln, 1999 and Segal, 1999 provide recent 
general overviews of the study of myth. On the ritual, cf. Rappaport, 1999.
3. Especially Brown, 1964, Beidelman, 1974, Nelson, 1969, 1973, and Bailey, 1970. A 
brilliant critique o f his views on religion is by Warburg, 1989.
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nition in the history o f social and cultural anthropology.4 This is largely 
due to the lack of understanding of his influence on scholars such as Frazer 
(with the exception of studies by Jones 1984, Ackerman, 1973 and 1991), 
Durkheim (1968[1912]), Mauss (1950), Malinowski (1961[1922]), and their 
followers. A notable exception is Mary Douglas, who wrote in Purity and 
Danger (London, 1966, p. 24; quoted by Sharpe, 1986: 81): “ Whereas 
Tylor was interested in what quaint relics can tell us of the past, Robertson 
Smith was interested in the common elements in modem and primitive 
experience. Tylor founded folk-lore [i/c]: Robertson Smith founded social 
anthropology.”5
Myth, its meaning and attempted explanations
The English word myth (as well as the Portuguese and Spanish mito, 
French mythe, etc.) comes from the old Greek muthos ([iuaoQ, which has 
been associated with a variety o f meanings and different concepts since the 
antiqu ity .6 According to Hofmann (Etym ologisches Wõrterbuch Des 
Griechischen, München, 1949; quoted in Popovic, 1987: 7), this word 
originated from the Indo-European root *mau/mou and it is closely related 
to the Lithuanian mausti (“to long for something,” “to wish something”) and 
the Serbo-Croatian and Slovenian misao (“thought”). According to another 
theory (Chantraine, 1968-1980, Vol. 3: 718-719), it is derived from the old 
Greek onomatopoeic mu (|iu), seen, for example, in the verb mudzo (iiuSÇo) 
-  “to murmur,” “to complain.”
It is widely recognized today that the distinction between |íu 8 o Ç  and 
ÀoyoÇ did not take place until late antiquity (cf. Ramnoux, 1990: 1039; 
Detienne, 1990), despite the fact that our modem (everyday) usage could be
4. This is the case primarily in the American anthropological tradition. Actually, he is the 
only 19th century anthropologist that is very highly regarded among British social anthro­
pologists (Sharpe, 1986: 81). Except for Beidelman, all o f  the authors that have been just 
cited above are not anthropologists.
5. Sharpe immediately asserts that “Tylor, o f course, did not found folklore.” In all fairness 
to Tylor, he himself refers to the new discipline he is writing about as ethnography (1871, 
Vol. 1:1).
6. This outline o f the word and its etymology is mostly based on Popovic, 1987.
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dated to the distinction made by the Ionian philosophers from the 6th century 
BCE. The word i^uctoÇ is recorded for the first time in Homer’s Iliad and 
Odyssey (ca. 750-650 BCE), where it has a variety of meanings, although 
the main meaning seems to be “word” or “speech.” However, in the 
Odyssey it also means “a public speech,” “excuse,” “conversation,” “fact,” 
“threat,” “reason,” and “story” or “tale.” This last meaning leaves open the 
question o f whether it is a true or fictional story (Popovic, 1987: 7). The 
meanings from the Iliad include “order,”7 “task,” “advice” and “intention” 
or “plan.”
Other Greek writers also used |íuüoÇ for “saying” (Aeschylus, 
Choephori 314), “hearsay” (Sophocles, Aiax 226), or “report” or “message” 
(Sophocles, Trachiniae 67). After the beginning of Ionian philosophy in the 
6th century BCE, (iuaoÇ was used to denote a “fictitious story,” something 
that has been made up (Pindar, 01. I, 29; Plato, Phaedo 61b), or a “legend” 
(Herodotus, Historice II, 45). It is this set of meanings that comes close to 
the modem (at least dictionary) translations of the word “myth.” As Burkert 
(1985: 312) puts it, the great change comes with the age of classical Athens 
in the 5th century BCE: “Myth is left behind. The word mythos, obsolete in 
Attic, is now redefined and devalued as the sort of story that the old poets 
used to tell and that old women still tell to their children.”
It is from this period on that the now famous distinction between “real” 
versus “mythic” takes place, as exemplified in the famous passage from 
Plato’s Phaedrus (229b-230b):
P h a e d r u s :  Tell me, Socrates, isn ’t it somewhere about here that they say 
Boreas* seized Orithya from the river?
S o c r a t e s :  Yes, that is the story.
P h a e d r u s :  Was this the actual spot? Certainly the water looks charmingly pure 
and clear; it’s just the place for girls to be playing beside the stream.
S o c r a t e s :  N o , it was about a quarter o f a mile [.sic] lower down, where you 
cross the sanctuary o f Agra; there is, I believe, an altar dedicated to Boreas close 
by.
P h a e d r u s :  I have never really noticed it, but pray tell me, Socrates, do you 
believe that story to be true?
7. That is to say “to order someone to do something.”
8. The North Wind.
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S o c r a t e s :  I should be quite in fashion if  I disbelieved it, a s  the men o f  science 
do. I might proceed to give a  scientific account of how the maiden, while at play 
with Pharmacia, was blown by a gust of Boreas down from the rocks hard by, 
and having thus met her death was said to have been seized by Boreas, though it 
may have happened on the Areopagus, according to another version of the occur­
rence. For my part, Phaedrus, I regard such theories as no doubt attractive, but as 
the invention of clever, industrious people who are not exactly to be envied, for 
the simple reason that they must then go on and tell us the real truth about the 
appearance o f centaurs and the Chimera, not to mention a whole host of such 
creatures, Gorgons and Pegasuses and countless other remarkable monsters of 
legend flocking in them. If our skeptic, with his somewhat crude science, means 
to reduce every one o f them to the standard o f probability, he’ll need a  deal of 
time for it. I  myself have certainly no time for the business [emphasis mine], and 
I’ll tell you why, my friend. I can’t as yet ‘know myself,’ as the inscription at 
Delphi enjoins, and so long as that ignorance remains it seems to me ridiculous to 
inquire into extraneous matters. Consequently I don’t bother about such things, 
but accept the current beliefs about them, and direct my inquiries, as I have just 
said, rather to myself, to discover whether I really am a  more complex creature 
and more puffed up with pride than Typhon, or a simpler, gentler being whom 
heaven has blessed with a quiet, un-Typhonic nature. By the way, isn’t this tree 
we were making for?5
Of course, one must add that even in this ancient Greek “age of reason,” 
the same author (Plato) uses myths to explain and expand his own philoso­
phical theories -  like, for example, the myth of the Prometheus and 
Epimetheus in the Protagoras (320d-322e), or the allegory of the cave in 
the seventh and the myth of Er in the tenth book of the Republic, etc.10 
But the die has been cast, and the new horizons opened.11 Another good 
example of these new horizons comes from Herodotus’ famous discussion
9. Translated by R. Hackforth. (The translation of the original Greek measure was done by 
the editors o f  Plato’s dialogues [Plato, 1963]). This is the same passage that F. Max 
Müller uses to begin his discussion of comparative mythology (Müller, 1909), as well as 
Cassirer to begin his masterly essay on language and myth (1953: 1-2).
10. Cf. Ricoeur (1969: 165): “We are encouraged in this attempt [toward dissociating myth and 
gnosis] by the great example o f Plato. Plato inserts myths into his philosophy; he adopts 
them as myths, in their natural state, so to speak, without trying to disguise them as expla­
nations; they are there in his discourse, full o f enigmas; they are there as myths, without 
any possibility of confusing them with knowledge.”
11. For the early views on the nature o f  myths and their relation to  th e  science, see 
Feyerabend (1981: 1-5, 8-9).
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o f the flooding o f the Nile (Historice II, 23-25), where he uses deductive 
reasoning to arrive at what he believes to be the correct answer.
In his study of the ancient Greek attitudes toward myth, Paul Veyne 
claims that “in Greece there existed a domain, the supernatural, where 
everything was to be learned from people who knew. It was composed of 
events, not abstract truths against which the listener could oppose his own 
reason...” (1988: 24).12 Veyne goes on to offer a definition that is based 
on the understanding of myth in antiquity, up through the 6th century CE:
Myth is information. There are informed people who have alighted, not on a 
revelation, but simply on some vague information they have chanced upon. If  they 
are poets, it will be the Muses, their appointed informants, who will tell them 
what is known and said. For all that, myth is not a revelation from above, nor is 
it arcane knowledge. The muse only repeats to them what is known -  which, like 
a natural resource, is available to all who seek it. [Veyne, 1988: 23]
It was only after the advent of a radically different system of knowledge 
in the Middle Ages that this Weltanschauung began to change. But the deba­
tes of antiquity are in many ways re-enacted in modem scholarship. And 
one of the many paradoxes of the study of myth is the fact that interest in it 
peaks in the 20th century, the age of great technological discoveries and the 
desperate human search for meanings.
The word “myth” became established in the English language only after 
the 1850s. F. Max Müller wrote “mythe,” and even “meith” was not an 
uncommon spelling (Müller, 1909: An). However, Müller (1823-1900) was 
one of the first scholars to attempt a rational analysis of myths. In his case, 
this analysis was based on language, and led him to conclude that myths are 
products of some sort of a “disease o f language.” Mythology (which for 
him meant both the body o f myths and a “scientific” attempt to explain 
them) was a product of the primordial sense of awe in the face of the forces 
and phenomena of nature.13 “Mythology is inevitable,” wrote Müller, “it is
12. This sharply contrasts with O’Flaherty (1988: 25-27), who states that the opposition be­
tween myth and truth comes from Plato.
13. This brief summary o f some non-anthropological attempts to explain myth is based on one 
o f my earlier articles (Boskovic, 1988: 409). Cohen (1969) and Segal (1980b) both repre­
sent excellent examples o f studies that take into account more anthropological works.
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natural, it is an inherent necessity of language, if we recognize in language 
the outward form and manifestation of thought; it is in fact the dark shadow 
whicn language throws upon thought, and which can never disappear till 
language becomes entirely commensurate with thought, which it never will” 
(Introduction to the Science o f  Religion, London, 1873, p. 353, quoted in 
Cassirer, 1953: 5).
The'criticism of Müller’s theory marks the beginning of the anthropolo­
gical approaches to the study of myth (Lang, 1884 and 1911). Müller was 
himself quite aware o f the limitations of his approach, and limited himself 
only to the area of his linguistic expertise (Indo-European languages) -  
unlike his followers. However, despite his heroic efforts (and his brilliant 
critique of evolutionism in anthropology!), most of Muller’s linguistic ana­
logies now seem extremely naive. Although people recognize the connection 
between the natural phenomena and the names of the deities, no one would 
today attempt to base an entire theory on these connections (cf. the dis­
cussion in Burkert, 1985).
The philosophical attempts to interpret myth reach their most elaborate 
level with the works of Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945). In the Philosophy o f  
Symbolic Forms, Cassirer (1953-57, Vol. 2) sees myth as one of the stages 
in the process of “humanization” (cf. Cassirer, 1922). It is on a lower level 
than philosophy or science, but the stage of “mythic thinking” has in itself 
(in a Hegelian way) the kernels of the stages that are yet to come. Although 
“lower” and “primitive,” it is a necessary stage in human development -  
and any higher stage is simply unthinkable without it.
Cassirer worked exclusively with secondary sources, and he had at his 
disposal a fantastic ethnographic collection in the library of his close friend 
Aby Warburg (cf. Krois, 1987: 22). His first critical study o f  myth was 
published in 1922, during his close association with the Warburg Institute. 
However, the anthropological data that he had access to have not always 
been assembled in a critical manner -  as becomes apparent to anyone rea­
ding his essays on myth today (Cassirer, 1922 and 1953). Nevertheless, the 
fact remains that Cassirer clearly recognized the importance o f myth, as 
well as the connection between language and myth (1953) and the impor­
tance of language in human understanding (1942, 1946). This last aspect is 
of particular interest to me, and I will come back to it later.
The psychological approach to the study of myth culminates in the work 
of Joseph Campbell (1904-1987). In the third volume of his monumental
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The Masks o f  God he states the four functions of mythology (1959-1970, 
Vol. 3: 519-522). The first one is installation of a sense of awe before the 
“mystery of existence,” a feeling that incorporates the recognition of the 
numinous, which is characteristic of all religions. The second basic function 
is the establishment of a cosmology, or image of the universe. The third 
one is support for the existing social order, since myths are always essen­
tially conservative. Finally, the fourth basic function is introducing the 
individual to the order of reality of his own psyche, leading this individual 
towards his or her spiritual self-realization.
Despite his enormous contributions to popularising interest in myth, 
Campbell lacks any serious theoretical background (except for the strong 
influence of C. G. Jung). Another problem with his work stems from his 
emphasis on one specific cultural horizon (India); this makes it difficult, if 
not impossible, for him to have an equal amount o f information about 
different parts of the world (which is what he was attempting).
Another very influential theory of myth is associated with the impressive 
oeuvre o f Mircea Eliade (1907-1986), who regarded myths primarily as 
sacred stories related to the events that occurred in illo tempore, in the 
mythical time following the creation of the world, and long before the 
advent o f history. This mythical time, illud tempus, is separated by an 
immeasurable gap from our (modpm) time, and the only way to approach it 
is through myths. Unlike Campbell, Eliade did not allow his strong back­
ground in India (Hindu religion, yoga) to bias his research. On the other 
hand, in shaping his theory of myth, Eliade was strongly influenced by the 
conceptions o f the native Australians -  particularly regarding the concept 
o f the Dreamtime, the altjeringa of the Arunta of Western Central Austra­
lia. Despite the claim that he was interested in two basic types of under­
standing myths, ancient and modem, he put strong emphasis only on the 
former aspect (Masuzawa, 1989: 321).
The fundamental difficulty with his approach is that, although it stimu­
lates phenomenological understanding of myths14 (as well as religion; for 
Eliade, these two concepts are closely related) from within the tradition
14. I am using the term “phenomenological” here in accordance with Husserl’s original usage: 
a model o f explanation from the phenomena themselves, essentially transsubjective. In this 
sense, it would mean the effort to interpret myths “from the native’s point o f view.” Eliade 
himself preferred the term “morphology.”
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where they originate and generates some kind of empathic Einfúhlung, it is 
hard to see how this theory can be tested less subjectively, and this poses 
serious obstacles for any serious scholarly research. For, if the gap is 
immeasurable, why try to measure it at all? If something is unspeakable (by 
its very nature), why try to speak about it at all?
In order to examine how anthropologists studied myth, it is time to 
move back towards Victorian Britain and the foundations of anthropology as 
we know it. At the same time that F. Max Müller was teaching at Oxford, 
another bright star flashed on the horizon of 19th century British anthropo­
logy and what we would today call the “human sciences,” William 
Robertson Smith.
The life of W. Robertson Smith
William Robertson Smith was bom on November 8,1846 in the valley 
of Don, parish of Keig, Aberdeenshire, Scotland.15 His father, William 
Pirie Smith, was a minister in the parish’s Free Church of Scotland, which 
came into existence after the 1843 split in the Church of Scotland. His 
mother “was a woman o f great force o f character, who retained till her 
death, at seventy-six years of age [in 1900], the full exercise of her keen 
intelligence” (Bryce, 1903: 312). A man of extraordinary erudition, Pirie 
Smith taught his children at home until it was time for them to attend the 
university. Among other things, he taught them Latin, Greek, mathematics, 
and “rational conversation.” According to his biographers, Black and 
Chrystal (1912a: 11-12), Smith learned the Hebrew alphabet and was able 
to read Hebrew words before he was six.
Smith entered the University of Aberdeen in 1861 and graduated in 1865 
with a Master of Arts degree and the Town Council Medal. In 1866 he 
entered New College in Edinburgh, where he studied under A. B.
15. This overview o f his life is based on Black and Chrystal, 1912a, with some additional 
information from Bryce, 1903, Brown, 1964, Beidelman, 1974, and Muilenberg in Smith, 
1969. A complete list of Smith’s works has been published by Brown (1964, Appendix B). 
A bibliography o f the publications related to his trial has been published by Beidelman 
(1974: 85-92).
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Davidson, Professor of Hebrew and Old Testament exegesis, who made a 
profound influence on him and probably pushed him decisively towards 
Semitic studies. However, at the time Smith was very much interested in 
physics and “natural philosophy,” and got his first teaching experience as 
assistant to P. G. Tait, Professor of Physics at the University o f Edinburgh 
in 1868/69. From 1865 to 1869 he made several trips to Germany (Bonn 
and Gottingen), where he continued his studies of physics and mathematics, 
but also became acquainted with the works of the Old Testament scholars 
associa ted  w ith “higher critic ism ” 16 (Albrecht Ritschl [1822-1889], 
Abraham Kuenen [1828-1891], later Julius Wellhausen [1844-1918]). These 
scholars made a lasting impression on him.
With the support of Davidson, in 1870 he was elected to the chair of 
Oriental Languages and Old Testament exegesis of the Free Church College 
at Aberdeen. Smith taught there until 1876, when a controversy surrounding 
several of his articles for the ninth edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica 
(especially “Bible,” published in 187517) forced him to withdraw from 
teaching. He was accused of heresy and tried, but successfully defended 
himself, so the formal charges had to be dropped.18 The controversy was 
renewed after the publication of his article “Animal worship and animal 
tribes among the Arabs and in the Old Testament” in the Journal o f Philo­
16. A school o f thought associated with the more scholarly (critical) approaches to the Bible, 
including comparative linguistic and historical approaches. It gained prevalence in Europe 
especially after the breakthroughs made by Kant (1724-1804) and Hegel (1770-1831) in 
philosophy, but also following investigations by Adolf Bastian (1826-1905) in ethnology. 
The most prominent British scholars who supported this new comparative approach were 
A. B. Davidson and T. K. Cheyne. For the relationship o f the proponents o f this approach 
and Smith, see Brown, 1964 and Bailey, 1970.
17. A nice summary is given by Bryce (1903: 313): “The propositions he stated regarding the 
origin o f  the parts o f  the Old Testament, particularly the Pentateuch, excited alarm and 
displeasure in Scotland, where few persons had become aware of the conclusions reached 
by recent Biblical scholars in Continental Europe. The article was able, clear, and fearless, 
plainly the work o f a master hand. The views it advanced were not for the most part due 
to Smith’s own investigations, but were to be found in the writings o f other learned men. 
Neither would they now be thought extreme; they are in fact accepted today by many 
writers o f unquestioned orthodoxy in Britain and a (perhaps smaller) number in the United 
States.”
18. For a more detailed account o f this trial and all the circumstances surrounding it, cf. 
chapters VI-X in Black and Chrystal, 1912a. A somewhat broader context is presented by 
Glover (1954) and Riesen (1985).
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logy in June 1880, after which he was forced to resign from teaching. How­
ever, W. R. Smith did remain ordained in the Free Church of Scotland.
The publicity surrounding the trial brought him immense support, not 
only from leading European scholars like Kuenen and Wellhausen, but also 
from the younger clergy and many of his countrymen. He was invited to 
give a series of lectures in Edinburgh and Glasgow. These lectures were a 
huge success, and they were published in 1881 as The Old Testament in the 
Jewish Church. Another series of lectures was given the following winter, 
and they were published in 1882 as The Prophets o f  Israel and Their Place 
in History to the Close o f the Eighth Century B.C. In 1881 Smith became 
the assistant editor and in 1883 editor-in-chief of the ninth edition o f the 
Encyclopcedia Britannica, a post that he held until the completion of this 
edition in 1889. The ninth edition was essential in setting standards for the 
years to come, and it brought together an unprecedented number o f highly 
qualified scholars, partly due to the immense breadth of Smith’s knowledge. 
He contributed over 200 articles himself.
Under his editorship, Andrew Lang (1844-1912) published the article 
“Mythology” in Volume 17 (published in 1884), an article that decisively 
argued against the philological and fo r  the anthropological study o f myth. In 
this period, Smith also met another fellow Scot, James G. Frazer (1854- 
1941), and asked him to contribute articles on “Totem” and “Taboo” for the 
Encyclopcedia. Smith has himself written of a totem as “an animal (less 
often a plant); the kindred is o f the stock of its totem; and to kill or eat the 
sacred animal is an impiety of the same kind with that of killing and eating 
a tribesman” (1886: 135; cf. also 1914: 124 ff; Cook, 1902). However, he 
preferred that Frazer do the work for the Encyclopcedia.19 In a letter to the 
publishers, he wrote:
I hope that Messrs. Black clearly understand that Totemism is a  subject of grow­
ing importance, daily mentioned in the magazines and papers, but o f which there 
is no good account anywhere -  precisely one o f  those cases where w e have an 
opportunity o f  getting ahead o f every one and getting some reputation. There is 
no article in the volume for which I am more solicitous. I have taken much perso­
nal pains with it, guiding Frazer carefully in his treatment; and he has put about
19. It was under Smith’s influence that Frazer developed his concepts o f the sacrifice of divine 
kings.
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seven months’ hard work on it to make it the standard article on the subject.
[Black and Chrystal, 1912a: 494]
Smith’s major classical works were published during this period: Kinship 
and Marriage in Early Arabia (1885), written under the strong influence of 
his friend John Ferguson McLennan (1827-1881), and Lectures on the 
Religion o f the Semites (first edition 1894). Between these two volumes, the 
extremely influential article “Sacrifice” was published in the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica in 1886. Lectures was the first in a series of three given in res­
ponse to an April 1887 invitation by the Burnett Trustees of the University 
o f Aberdeen to deliver lectures on “the primitive religions of the Semitic 
peoples, viewed in relation to other ancient religions, and to the spiritual 
religion of the Old Testament and Christianity.” The first two series “were 
devoted to mythological matters and the main features of Semitic poly­
theism, and the third to Semitic views of the creation and government of the 
world” (Black and Chrystal, 1912a: 535). The second series was delivered 
in March o f 1890, but very little was known about it -  until John Day 
rediscovered the original manuscript in the early 1990s (Day, 1995). The 
general subject of the third and last series, delivered in the Marischal 
College, on December 10, 12 and 14, 1891 was “[t]he nature and origin of 
the gods of Semitic Heathenism,, their relations to one another, the myths 
that surround them, and the whole subject of religious belief, so far as is 
not directly involved in the observances of daily religious life” (Black and 
Chrystal, ibid.; cf. Smith, 1914, Preface to the first edition). Unfortunately, 
illness prevented Smith from completing these other two series for publica­
tion. Only two weeks before his death, Smith completed revisions to his 
original Lectures manuscript, which he passed on to his friend J. Sutherland 
Black (Smith, 1914: xi).
In 1883 Smith accepted Lord Almoner’s Readership in Arabic at the 
University of Cambridge and became a fellow of Trinity College. He be­
came a fellow of Christ’s College (the same Cambridge college attended by 
men like John Milton and Charles Darwin before him) in 1885, and a year 
later, University Librarian. In 1889 he was appointed to the chair of the 
Professor of Arabic, a post that he held until his death, at Cambridge, on 
March 31, 1894.
On the occasion of his death, the General Assembly of the Free Church 
of Scotland (the same institution that had tried him as a heretic during his
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lifetime!) adopted a formal resolution, stating that: “His intellectual energy 
and industry, his quick apprehension, his singular command of his -varied 
knowledge, along with a rare power of clear and felicitous expression, 
combined to rank him among the most remarkable men of his time” (Black 
and Chrystal, 1912a: 560).
Anthropology, religion, and myth
Unlike many of his contemporaries, who wrote extensively about peo­
ples and cultures that they had never seen, Smith was able to make several 
trips to the geographic area of his expertise. In the winter o f 1878/79 he 
went to Cairo and Palestine. His relatively dark complexion, the fact that he 
wore native clothes, and his excellent command of Arabic enabled him to 
blend easily with people and make friends. Smith returned to the Middle 
East in 1880, and then travelled extensively throughout the Arabian peninsu­
la all the way to Suez, spending two months at Jeddah and visiting Pales­
tine, Syria, and Tunis (Smith, 1912b). He again travelled to the Middle East 
in 1889 and 1890.
Details and observations from the 1880 trip were preserved in a series of
11 letters published between February and June 1880 in the Scotsman. In 
this ethnographic account Smith demonstrates great knowledge of the coun­
tries that he travelled through and the customs of the people inhabiting 
them. Unfortunately, he was also a prisoner of the prejudices of his time, 
quite happy with his own Britishness (ibid.: 493, 500), and not particularly 
well disposed towards Islam (p. 511). In regard to the distribution o f Chris­
tian books in the area, Smith noted that “in the interests of civilisation and 
of that progress which is seriously retarded by the current Moslem notion 
that their dry and barren literature is the most perfect that can be consi­
dered, it is heartily to be desired that a door should be opened to the circu­
lation of Christian literature” (pp. 566-567). This, among other things, 
because he believed that “[t]he Koran is the bulwark of all the prejudices 
and social backwardness in the East” (p. 568).
Smith came to anthropology after the publication of Tylor’s Primitive 
Culture (1871), and he shared an evolutionist perspective (cf. Smith, 1914:
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2; Jones, 1984: 50-51 )20 with his fellow anthropologists.21 He firmly 
believed that Christianity (especially as exemplified in Scottish Presbyte- 
rianism) is the highest possible form of religion, although he did give credit to 
the ancient Semitic peoples (especially the Jews) for being essentially on the 
right track. Both the Arabs and the Jews, he felt, represented religious 
practices that Christian religion had to pass in the past, so it was very im­
portant to understand these religions (as well as other, “primitive” ones, 
which could be successfully contrasted with them) in order to fully under­
stand Christianity.
The “comparative method” that he advocated was based on the concept 
o f “survivals,” made especially popular by Tylor (1832-1917). These “sur­
vivals” were traits of the ancient beliefs and social customs that have been 
preserved in the contemporary societies, even though their original function 
and meaning were lost. Through exploring survivals among the ‘uncivilized’ 
peoples, Tylor hoped to show both the origin of modem concepts and cus­
toms, as well as some pointers for the future development (Boskovic, 
2003). The main problem with this method, as pointed out by Margit War­
burg, was “that deciding whether something is a survival or not must be 
based on a priori suppositions of the direction and character of historical 
development. As a consequence the method easily leads to tautologies 
and/or becomes supported by prejudices” (1989: 45).
In his article “Sacrifice” for the Encyclopcedia Britannica, Smith makes 
a distinction between “natural” and “positive” religions (1886: 132). The 
former ones (“nature religions of the civilized races of antiquity”) are de­
fined as
... [the] religions which had a predominantly joyous character, and in which the 
relations o f  man to the gods were not troubled by any habitual and oppressive 
sense o f  human guilt, because the divine standard of man’s duty corresponded 
broadly with the accepted standard o f civil conduct, and therefore, though the god
20. The following lines from Lectures provide a good example: “Savages, we know, are not 
only incapable o f  separating in thought between phenomenal and noumenal existence, but 
habitually ignore the distinctions, which to us seem obvious, between organic and inor­
ganic nature, or within the former region between animals and plants” (1914: 85-86).
21. With the possible exception o f Lang who, while drawing heavily on Tylor’s work in his 
earlier publications (1885, 1887), is very critical o f both Tylor and Frazer in his Magic 
and Religion (1901).
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might be angry with his people for a time, or even irreconcilably wroth with 
individuals, the idea was hardly conceivable that he could be permanently 
alienated from the whole circle o f  his worshippers, ? that is, from all who parti­
cipated in a certain local (tribal or national) cult. [Smith, 1886: 134; cf. also 
Smith, 1914: 285]
On the other hand, “positive” religions are the ones of the inhabitants of 
the ancient Near East, or, as Smith put it, “Judaism, Christianity and Islam 
are positive religions” because they “trace their origin to the teaching of the 
great religious innovators, who spoke as the organs of a divine revelation, 
and deliberately departed from the traditions of the past” (1914: 1). Smith 
also saw these religions as “tribal or national” (1892: 281), a concept which 
introduced a very important social component into the study of religion.
The god, it would appear, was frequently thought o f as the physical progenitor or 
first father o f  his people.22 At any rate, the god and his worshippers formed a 
natural unity, which was also bound up with the land they occupied... The disso­
lution o f the nation destroys the national religion, and dethrones the national 
deity. The god can no more exist without his people than the nation without its 
god [emphasis mine].23 [Smith, 1892: 281]
The supreme deity is associated with the concept of the ruler or king 
(1886: 133).24 The local god is in this perspective seen as a mediator 
between the people and the various aspects of their environment (“nature”), 
so the worshippers are in a permanent alliance with selected aspects of a
22. On the concept o f the deity as father (“progenitor and lord”), cf. Smith, 1886: 135.
23. Cf. Smith, 1912a: 463: “There is nothing surprising in the conception that the worshippers 
axe sons of their god.” On the “kinship between gods and men,” cf. also Smith, 1914: 87- 
88. “Broadly speaking, the land o f a god corresponds with the land of his worshippers; 
Canaan is Jehovah’s land as Israel is Jehovah’s people,” in the same way as “the land of 
Assyria (Asshur) has its name from the god Asshur” (1914: 92). Smith also ventures in the 
attempts to explain the concept o f  the holy (1914: 91ff), making the distinction between 
the sacred and the profane. Like many other aspects o f his work, this distinction came into 
the anthropology via Durkheim.
24. This closely corresponds to information that has been gained from subsequent research into 
the extensive written records of the ancient Near Eastern cities, since it seems that all of 
them had a principal deity, who was paired with a consort (Pritchard, 1991: 68). The 
ancient Greek texts, beginning with the Iliad and Odyssey, indicate the same pattern.
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natural life (1914: 124). The beginnings of the sociology of religion do not 
seem too far from realizations like this one:
We are so accustomed to think of religion as a thing between individual men and 
God that we can hardly enter into the idea of a religion in which a whole nation 
in its national organisation appears as the religious unit, -  in which we have to 
deal not with the faith and obedience of individual persons, but with the faith and 
obedience o f a nation as expressed in the functions of national life. [Smith, 1902: 
20]
This social concept o f religion predates Durkheim and, in fact, 
Durkheim (1968: 61, 109n, 455; cf. also Beidelman, 1974: 58) was quite 
clear in giving Smith the credit that he deserves.25
Like the great majority of his contemporaries (with the notable exception 
o f Müller and his followers), Smith believed that the best way to study 
religion was to examine its most primitive form. In the case of the Semitic 
peoples, this form was preserved in the life and customs of the 'Bedouin 
pastoralists, an argument that he already made in his book Kinship and 
Marriage in Early Arabia (1885). His emphasis on the social components of 
religion led him to postulate that it is the action that matters, much more 
than the belief. The ritual, therefore, must come before the myth. The 
passage where Smith argued for the supremacy of ritual over myth is one of 
the most influential passages in the history of anthropology, so I will quote 
from it extensively:
In all the antique religions, mythology takes the place o f dogma; that is, the 
sacred lore of priests and people, so far as it does not consist o f mere rules for the 
performance o f  religious acts, assumes the form o f  stories about gods; and 
these stories afford the only explanation that is offered of the precepts o f religion 
and the prescribed rules of ritual. But, strictly speaking, this mythology was no 
essential part o f ancient religion, for it had no sacred sanction and no binding 
force on the worshippers. The myths connected with individual sanctuaries and
25. “Émile Durkheim indicated that he owed Smith his insights regarding the close relation 
between people’s perceptions o f nature and their experience in society, his views on the 
periodic need for ritual to reinforce social beliefs and values, and his method o f explaining 
religion in term s o f  the irreducible elem ents exhibited in its m ost prim itive state” 
(Beidelman, 1987: 366).
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ceremonies were merely part o f the apparatus of the worship; they served to 
excite the fancy and sustain the interest o f the worshipper; but he was often 
offered a choice o f the several accounts of the same thing, and, provided that he 
fulfilled the ritual with accuracy, no one cared what he believed about its origin. 
Belief in a certain series o f myths was neither obligatory as a  part o f the true 
religion, nor was it supposed that, by believing, a man acquired religious merit 
and conciliated the favour o f the gods. What was obligatory or meritorious was 
the exact performance of certain acts prescribed by religious tradition. This being 
so, it follows that mythology ought not to take the prominent place that is too 
often assigned to it in the scientific study of ancient faiths. So far as the myths 
consist o f explanation o f ritual, their value is altogether secondary, and it may be 
affirmed with confidence that in almost every case the myth was derived from the 
ritual and not the ritual from the myth; for the ritual was fixed and the myth was 
variable, the ritual was obligatory and faith in the myth was at the discretion of 
the worshipper. [...] As a rule the myth is no explanation of the origin o f the 
ritual to any one who does not believe it to be a  narrative o f  real occurrences, and 
the boldest mythologist will not believe that. But if  it not be true, the myth itself 
requires to be explained, and every principle o f philosophy and common sense 
demand that the explanation be sought, not in arbitrary allegorical categories, but 
in the actual facts o f ritual or religious custom to which the myth attaches. The 
conclusion is, that in the study of ancient religions we must begin, not with myth, 
but with ritual and traditional usage. [Smith, 1914: 17-18, passim]
Smith believed that ritual should be considered before myth not only in 
order of importance (unlike the majority of the studies of his time), but that 
ritual literally preceded myth in time (Beidelman, 1974: 64). Actions come 
first, human attempts to explain and rationalize them afterwards.26 This 
passage can also be understood as a reaction against the generalizations on 
the lines o f the idea o f the “primitive science” of the “ savages,” as 
expressed by Lang (1884, 1887, 1911). Smith obviously believed that too 
much attention in the works of his time was being devoted to the beliefs and 
“stories about gods,” at the expense of the rituals. Rituals should form the 
basis o f any serious scholarship on “primitive religion,” since they are 
essentially social in character^ and since they reaffirm places and roles o f 
average human beings within their communities (ethnic groups or tribes).
26. A similar view was expressed in the early 1940s by Susanne K. Langer (1971: 126 ff), 
who noted that “ [i]t is not at all impossible that ritual, solemn and significant, antedates 
the evolution of language” (1971: 128). Cassirer also believed (following the predominant 
anthropological theories of his time) that ritual comes before myth (cf. Krois, 1987: 85-99).
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What these individuals believed (or did not believe) in was a matter of their 
personal choice. What they were performing or participating in was not. 
Therefore, the importance of myths was based on their role in the society -  
another aspect of his work that became more prominent through the writings 
of Durkheim.
In the commentary to the third edition o f the Lectures, Stanley A. Cook 
noted that myths “are specifically of personal interest, but, in general, they 
appeal differently to the different types of mind in normal mixed communi­
ties” (Smith, 1969: 502). The notion of the “personal interest” is veiy im­
portant here, considering Smith’s emphasis on the social components in all 
religions. Naturally, since the “positive religions” are much more elaborate 
and “advanced,” this social component becomes more prominent in them. 
Myths might have been more important to the less civilized cultures, but in 
Judaism, Christianity and Islam, they play a secondary role, more as a 
remnant and a reminder of the less civilized stages through which even 
these religions had to pass.
In his commentary Cook distinguished between “primary” and “secon­
dary” myths (Smith, 1969: 500-503). The “primary” ones are connected 
with the system of beliefs and the specific worldview, and they are pri­
marily associated with the ritual action. On the other hand, “secondary” 
ones are less important in terms of their value. “They are based upon mis­
understandings (e.g. of images, words, names); they are explanations of 
explanations, the key to an old tradition having been lost” (Smith, 1969: 
501). It is possible for these myths to get “purified” and reworked into the 
“pleasing tales,” but in all cases these myths are very remote from the 
concepts associated with them in “primitive” cultures. While accepting the 
concept of the greater importance of ritual action, Cook also noted “the risk 
o f going into another extreme and making the distinction between myth and 
ritual too absolute” (ibid.).
Although Smith’s theory received high praise by some of the leading 
scholars at the beginning of the 20th century (cf. Reinach, 1911: 437-438), 
it stood in sharp contrast to the view about the complexity of the material 
that myths consisted o f (Lang, 1884, 1911). Andrew Lang has already 
profoundly influenced the study of myth with his notion that myths should 
be studied as some kind of a “primitive science.” The idea of the essential 
difference between different cultures was the fatal blow to the comparative 
study o f myths. There is a degree o f similarity necessary for any compa­
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rison, and Lang showed that this degree is not present in, for example, 
ancient Greek and Australian Aboriginal cultures.
The concept o f the subordination of myth to ritual was already 
challenged in the articles for the another monument of scholarship, Encyclo­
paedia o f  Religion and Ethics (Fallaize, 1924). In the same project, Hartley 
Burr Alexander (1924: 752) noted that “the meaning does not stop with the 
notion of act, it is also the attitude.” The attitude is influenced by the belief, 
which is in its turn influenced by the faculty, etc. The explanation o f ritual 
action is extremely complex, and if  we attempt to understand myths pri­
marily as something subordinate to rituals, we will not get very far. The 
implications of Smith’s views for the study of totemism have been criticized 
by Cook (1902),27 ignored by Frazer (1996), and completely rejected by 
the disciples of Durkheim, especially Mauss (1950). It is no wonder that 
Smith’s view of myth and ritual did not exercise great influence in the 
history of religions, sociology of religion, and related disciplines. Anthropo­
logy, however, was a completely different story.
Anthropological approaches to the study of myth
William Robertson Smith was the first scholar who tried to define the 
relationship between myth and ritual. As already shown above, he clearly 
gave the preference to ritual. This influenced anthropologists after him to 
the effect that they were primarily looking at the social (sociological) as­
pects of the cultures and societies that they were studying. The myths were 
considered important primarily because they could tell something about the 
social organization, kinship, customs, etc.
The importance of myths was clearly recognized from the beginnings o f 
anthropology as a scientific discipline in the late 1880s. Chapters on “be­
liefs” and “rituals” were standard in all major ethnographies. A view of the 
founder of the American anthropology, Franz Boas (1858-1942), was that 
the native peoples’ customs and rituals were rapidly disappearing in light o f
27. S. A. Cook actually noted that if  Smith was still alive, he would have modified his posi­
tion (1902: 447).
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huge technological advances and enormous colonial expansion. This was 
leading to the permanent disappearance of something that Boas saw as the 
legacy of the whole world. One way to preserve this legacy was to go to the 
field and record Native American narratives -  as many as possible.
Of course, now we know that the Native American societies were cons­
tantly changing and adapting under new circumstances, not disappearing, 
but the misconception of Boas and his disciples led to the production of 
some excellent collections of narratives. In fact, no period can match the 
amount of ethnographic data gathered on the Native American cultures in 
the two decades at the beginning of the 20,h century. Tsimshian Mythology 
(1916) stands as perhaps the finest example of scholarship from this period.
In this magnificent volume, Boas attempted to present a summary of the 
customs and society of Tsimshian Indians from the British Columbia. This 
account was based on the stories collected by a native Tsimshian, Henry W. 
Tate. Boas also attempted to make a distinction between myths and tales 
(1916: 31), but without much success, since for the Tsimshians, there was 
no difference -  at least none that the outside observer could be aware of. 
In the end, he settled for a compromise, describing the subject of this vo­
lume “a series of tales all of which are considered by the Tsimshian as 
myths” (1916: 595).
The issue of distinguishing between myths and “ordinary” or “folk” tales 
has puzzled anthropologists since Andrew Lang. The problem was clearly 
recognized by the functionalists, beginning with Bronislaw Malinowski 
(1884-1942).
Malinowski’s field work experience came virtually as an accident, since 
he was stranded at the Trobriand Islands, off the North-eastern coast of 
Papua New Guinea, during the WW I (1915-1918). This experience even­
tually  resulted  in a m onograph devoted to the Trobriand islanders 
(Malinowski, 1961 [1922]). Parts of this monograph deal with the myths 
and rituals connected with the Kula. Malinowski believed that myths repre­
sent a “pragmatic charter,” a set of rules or codes of conduct, that enable 
the social functions of the culture to flourish. “The myth comes into play 
when rite, ceremony, or a social or moral rule demands justification, 
warrant o f antiquity, reality, and sanctity” (1926: 28). Like Boas before 
him, Malinowski sought to distinguish between three types of tales that he 
encountered in the Trobriand Islands. Unlike fairy tales and legends, which 
are told “for amusement” and as “a social statement” intended to “satisfy
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social ambition” (Malinowski, ibid.), myth is “a reality lived” (1926: 18), 
“not symbolic, but a direct expression o f its subject-matter; it is not an 
explanation  in satisfaction o f a scientific interest, but a narrative 
resurrection of a primeval reality” (1926: 19).
This, of course, stood in sharp contrast to the words of Smith, since for 
Malinowski, myths offer justification for belief. They are again intimately 
associated with rituals (on mythology of the Kula, see Malinowski, 1961: 
299ff), but in an inverted order of importance. Even if rituals do come first, 
myths are necessary in order to comprehend their meaning and true 
function. If rituals form a re-enactment of the events that are considered to 
have happened in another reality,28 myths are necessary in order to place 
individuals (and the society or the culture itself) within that reality.
In the Argonauts o f  the Western Pacific, Malinowski distinguished 
between several classes of myths (1961: 304-305). The “oldest myths” 
describe events that occurred when the earth was being inhabited from the 
underworlds, and they are related to the origin of the first human beings, 
clans, and villages, as well as the relationship between this world and any 
future world. The “kultur myths" relate to ogres and cannibals, as well as to 
the human beings that institute certain customs and ceremonies. They relate 
to the events when human beings already inhabit the earth, and when the 
social customs are already established. Stories about the Trobriand culture 
hero, Tudava, were also included within this class. Finally, the third class 
consists o f “myths in which figure only ordinary human beings". These 
hum an beings do have extraordinary powers (magic, which is, for 
Malinowski, closely related to religion), and these stories describe the ori­
gins of witchcraft, love potions, flying canoes (1961: 311-316), as well as 
some Kula myths.
Of course, many myths fall within two or even all three of these cate­
gories (1961: 305), and the distinctions between them are not always clear. 
The main force that lies behind the life of the Trobriands is “the inertia of 
custom” (1961: 326). Since the Trobriands pay so much attention to the 
customs, Malinowski concluded that “the past is more important than the 
present” (1961: 327). Stories from the past also possess an element of
28. Which is, nevertheless, as real as the one that we live in.
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universality (everybody knows them and everybody talks about them), and 
this contributes to the normative function of myths.
The emphasis on normative and social aspects clearly distinguishes 
anthropology from the other disciplines that deal with myths, like philo­
sophy (Ricceur, 1990), history (Ricoeur, 1987), or history o f religions 
(Boon, 1987). Another important distinction is the emphasis of anthropolo­
gists and ethnologists since Smith on the ritual action itself. As far as an­
thropologists and ethnologists are concerned, this emphasis was mostly 
taken for granted, and myths and rituals were studied together, without any 
attempt to clarify their relationship. One of the first anthropologists that 
attempted to clarify this relationship was Clyde Kluckhohn (1905-1960).
In his seminal article “Myths and Rituals: A General Theory,” originally 
presented in 193 9,29 Kluckhohn elaborated on the “connection between rite 
and myth,” clearly recognized by- the psychoanalysts like Reik and Freud, 
who “verbally agreed to Robertson Smith’s proposition that mythology was 
mainly a description of ritual” (1942: 45-46). This reference to psycho­
analytical interpretations is not an accident, since Kluckhohn was very 
interested in various psychological explanations (1942: 50-52), which he 
believed to have been neglected in prior anthropological research. He also 
pointed at the difficulties of making a clear distinction between myths, 
legends, and fairy tales (1942: 46-47) -  unlike Malinowski before him.30 
He did consider a definition of myth as a “sacred tale” (p. 47),31 but found 
it unsatisfactory because of the lack of association with ritual.32 And, while 
there are cultures that associate myths and rituals (Kluckhohn gave an 
example o f the Christian Mass), there are clearly others (and here he drew 
on his extensive fieldwork experience among Navahos and Pueblos) that do
29. Several years before this article, an interesting (although very brief) discussion on the 
value o f “Myth and Ritual” approach was published in the September and November 1936 
issues o f  Man. On the one side was the greatest anthropological proponent o f  this 
approach, A. M. Hocart. On the other side was the famous Classical scholar H. J. Rose. 
Rose’s expertise in a specific area (ancient Greece) outweighed Hocart’s general argumen­
tation.
30. A clear impossibility o f  making this kind o f distinction was demonstrated by Kirk (1974: 
31-37) on the material from Greece.
31. Nevertheless, there is at least one place in the text (1942: 59) where he does use this 
definition himself.
32. In this article, Kluckhohn uses words ritual, rite, and ceremony interchangeably.
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not. As a matter of fact, “the whole question o f the primacy of ceremonial 
or mythology is as meaningless as all the questions of ‘the hen or the egg’ 
form” (1942: 54).
The truly important thing is the recognition of the “intricate interdepen­
dence of myth (which is one form of ideology) with ritual and many other 
forms of behavior” {ibid.). Here Kluckhohn gave full credit to Malinowski 
(1926), although he in fact went much further by pointing at the potential 
absurdity of another “hen or egg” type problem. Together with Boas and 
Benedict, Kluckhohn opposed any grand generalizations or “simplistic state­
ments.” There is no practical way to establish the primacy of one or the 
other, but one can only look at the “general tendency” within specific cul­
ture. This tendency will depend on a number of specific cultural traits, as 
well as on the individual responses to these traits (1942: 70). In the end, 
Kluckhohn remained close to the psychology-influenced theories, since he 
concludes that “[m]yths and rituals equally facilitate the adjustment of the 
individual to his society” (p. 74). They have “a common psychological 
basis” (p. 78), and in a sense they are “supra-individual.” They are both 
“cultural products, part of the social heredity of a society” (p. 79).
The idea of both myth and ritual as cultural products was further de­
veloped by Sir Edmund Leach (1910-1989). Like Malinowski, Leach was 
caught up during the war (in his case, WW II) in the area where he was 
doing his field work, Burma (Myanmar). Several years before (in 1938), his 
fieldwork in Kurdistan had been frustrated by another political crisis 
(München declaration), so this almost looked like a pattern. However, 
Leach was able to save most of his field notes, and, after the intensive 
archival work after the war, he was able to put forth his monograph on the 
Political Systems o f  Highland Burma in 1954.
Like Smith’s, Leach’s discussion of myth and ritual is rather brief, 
confined to less than seven pages of the Introduction. Unlike most of his 
famous predecessors, Leach did not attempt to define ritual, and from his 
perspective any particular definition (except one as broad as “a system o f 
symbolic communication” [cf. Aimer, 1987: 7]) is irrelevant. What is rele­
vant is the very specific context he provides for any situation where rituals 
are observed. In this approach, Leach attempted to reconcile divergent 
views represented by Durkheim, Mauss, and Malinowski before him. The 
solution, in his opinion, was a view o f a ritual as something related to  
technique just as sacred is related to profane. They “ do not denote types o f
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action but aspects of almost any kind o f action.” Ritual “is a symbolic 
statement which ‘says’ something about the individuals involved in the 
action” (1970: 13).
“Myth, in my terminology, is the counterpart of ritual; myth implies 
ritual, ritual implies myth, they are one and the same” (ibid.). In this sense, 
Leach consciously stepped away from what he regarded to be “the classical 
doctrine in English social anthropology” which, according to him, claimed
that myth and ritual are conceptually separate entities which perpetuate one 
another through functional interdependence -  the rite is a dramatization of the 
myth, the myth is the sanction or charter for the rite [...] As I see it, myth regar­
ded as a statement in words ‘says’ the same thing as ritual regarded as a statement 
in action. To ask questions about the content of belief which are not contained in 
the content o f ritual is nonsense. [1970: 13-14]
This presents a radical break with the functionalism, and an important 
step towards the structural interpretations of myth.33 For Leach, myths are 
only “one way of describing certain types o f human behaviour” (: 14). 
Furthermore, “ritual action and belief are alike to be understood as forms of 
symbolic statement about the social order” (ibid.). This is possible because 
rituals in their cultural contexts ape always patterns of symbols, and they 
have the same structure as the other pattern of symbols, consisting of the 
phrases and technical terms that the anthropologist devises in order to inter­
pret them (: 15).
This structure is “the system of socially approved ‘proper’ relations 
between individuals and groups” (ibid.). Although this system is not always 
practically recognized, “if anarchy is to be avoided,” members of the so­
ciety must be reminded of the underlying structure that provides the frame 
for all of their social activities. “Ritual performances have this function for 
the participating group as a whole; they momentarily make explicit what is 
otherwise a fiction” (p. 16).
In a later stage of his career, during his experiments with the interpreta­
tion of the Biblical myths, Leach came to regard myths as information
33. The works o f  Lévi-Strauss became better known in the English-speaking world only after 
1955. However, it is reasonable to expect that Leach was aware to a certain extent o f some 
o f  his concepts before that.
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(1969: 8; cf. supra, p. 7), not unlike the bits in the contemporary informa­
tion systems. However, he eventually rejected this view and the struc­
turalism notion of the universal processes in human minds as a kind of 
“metaphysics.” His negative attitude towards grand generalizations places 
him as one of the important predecessors of the “narrative approach.”
In 1955, the article “The Structural Study of Myth” by Claude Lévi- 
Strauss announced the coming of structuralism to the anthropological study 
of myth. In this extraordinary article, the French professor argued that we 
should proceed directly from the apparent contradictions that myths pose 
(1963: 208). Approximately at the same time as Leach, but more clearly 
and much more explicitly, Lévi-Strauss recognized myths as communi­
cation. In fact, he recognized a clear connection between myths and lan­
guage (since myths are expressed through language). Along the lines of the 
great Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, as well as Trubetzkoy, Jakobson 
and H jelm slev,34 Lévi-Strauss recognized another system of signs that 
could be interpreted in a similar way as language. Since myth, just like 
language, is made of constitutive units, these units “presuppose the consti­
tuent units present in language when analyzed on other levels -  namely, 
phonemes, morphemes, and sememes -  but they, nevertheless, differ from 
the latter in the same way as the latter differ among themselves; they belong 
to a higher and a more complex order” (1963: 210-211). He called these 
units mythemes. It is only through the analysis o f the relations of different 
mythemes (whose structure remains in the unconscious) that we can under­
stand the meaning of a myth. Understood in this way, we can say that 
myth, using Saussurean terminology, should serve as a kind of an allo- 
chronic device, bridging the gap between the synchronic and diachronic 
perspective.
Lévi-Strauss began teaching Amerindian “mythology” in 1952/53, and in 
an outline of his first course, he presented three ways o f analysing a myth: 
“in terms of the reversible or irreversible character o f  the sequences present 
in it,” in terms o f “the tests of commutability,” and, finally, “the myth, 
considered as a thought ritual, is submitted to a direction which is in some
34. For the practical as well as theoretical aspects of their works, I refer to overviews in Nõth, 
1990. See also chapter on myth (almost exclusively dedicated to the structuralist aspects of 
study) in this volume (1990: 374-377).
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way natural and emerges from the analysis of ritual considered as an acted 
myth. This third method provides a valuable verification of the results 
obtained by the other two” (1987: 200-201).
His view of the relationship between myth and ritual is a little bit more 
elaborated in his lectures for 1954/55. Unlike his predecessors (especially 
Leach), Lévi-Strauss pointed at the fact that in many cases (he was still 
working prim arily with the Amerindian material, mostly Pueblo and 
Pawnee) there is no proof of the interrelationship between myth and ritual.
There is no myth underlying the ritual as a whole, and when foundation myths 
exist, they generally bear on details o f the ritual which appear secondary or super­
numerary. However, if  myth and ritual do not mirror each other, they often reci­
procally complete each other, and it is only by comparing them that one can 
formulate hypotheses on the nature o f certain intellectual strategies typical o f the 
culture under consideration. [Lévi-Strauss, 1987: 204]
In a way, this brings us full circle in the consideration of the relation­
ship between myth and ritual. For Lévi-Strauss (as for Smith, but for en­
tirely different reasons), this relationship is not a matter of great impor­
tance. Theoretically speaking, any myth can be re-enacted just by being 
spoken (narrated or written down). As far as the meaning of the myths and 
their interpretation is concerned, rituals are irrelevant.
Although it exercised enormous influence in anthropology (Mandelbaum, 
1987), Lévi-Strauss’ theory of the interpretation of myth was severely criti­
cized (for example, Kirk, 1970; Cohen, 1969: 345-347).35 Some of his 
basic theoretical assumptions were questioned by Geertz (1973, 1988) and 
Ricceur (1981, 1987, 1990). While acknowledging its importance, Ricceur 
criticized structural analysis for “de-chronologizing” the narrative, since 
“[the] structural analysis tends to reduce the role of plot to a secondary 
function of figuration in relation to underlying logical structures and the 
transformation of these structures” (1981: 280).
Barthes (1988: 170) questioned the binary oppositions that form the basis 
of Lévi-Strauss’ (and all other structural) theoretical models:
35. For the reply to Kirk (and Mary Douglas), see Lévi-Strauss, 1987: 96-101.
129
ALEKSANDAR BOSKOVIC
Binarism is seductive logical hypothesis: we know its success in phonology, in 
cybernetics, even in physiology. Yet limits are already appearing, and certain 
compromises are required; Martinet refuses to grant a universal status to the 
binarism of phonological oppositions, and Jakobson has completed the schema of 
the binary opposition (alb) by the adjunction o f two derived terms, one neutral 
(neither a nor b), the other mixed (both a and 6); Lévi-Strauss himself has often 
acknowledged the importance o f the neutral term or zero degree.36
It can be argued that, by taking the structuralist method from Saussurean 
linguistics, Lévi-Strauss tries to extend the usefulness o f this method far 
beyond the Saussure’s original intent. In doing this, he would have to mo­
dify significantly the method itself (which he does not do) in order to 
succeed. Nevertheless, the structuralist insistence on language (Saussurean 
langue and parole, von Humboldt’s ergon and energia), as well as on the 
use of signs and symbols in the explanation of myths, was the important 
step forward. In almost a century since Smith’s death, the world had chan­
ged. It was time for anthropologists to try to do the same.
Conclusion: narration and interpretation
So far I have shown the striking parallels between some o f Smith’s 
concepts about the relationship of myth and ritual, and the ones from some 
later anthropologists -  as well as some of the responses to these concepts. 
The list of scholars and their works presented here is by no means exhaus­
tive, but I do believe that the most influential ones of the 20th century have 
been presented. In the concluding part of this article, I want to point to 
some more recent approaches, as well as to some of the questions that the 
study of myth opens.
Obviously, if we ask someone while that person is performing some 
ritual why he or she is doing it, we will get the answer “because I believe 
in this and that.” This line of questioning, while providing a  secure link 
between myth and ritual, leads to conclusions that are essentially tautolo­
gical and uninformative. People usually dress more in the colder weather,
36. For example, see his Introduction in Mauss, 1950. This is also referred to in a footnote by 
Barthes.
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but this has nothing to do with whether they believe that they should dress 
more or not. Many activities (even repetitive ones, like political and other 
public rituals) are grounded in the social and psychological aspects of socie­
ties, not in myths or beliefs.
The main importance of the structuralist approach is that it shifted the 
focus o f the methodology of dealing (that is to say, transcribing, telling, re­
enacting, writing, remembering, etc.) with myths to language. The em­
phasis on structure in a wider sense is characteristic for contemporary struc­
turalist anthropologists -  like Viveiros de Castro (1992) and Overing 
(1995), who use structuralism in a more general context -  to present the 
meanings and values that people express through their myths.
As already noted above, authors as diverse as O ’Flaherty, Homer, 
Pindar, Plato, Eliade, Cook, Boas, Malinowski, and Kluckhohn, have regarded 
myth as essentially a story. The same is true for Fontenrose (1966) and 
Kirk (1970, 1974). As vague as Kirk’s formulation “that what the majority of 
people consider to be the myths” is, it clearly takes into account the fact that 
the social group might or might not consider something to be “myth,” “tale,” 
“sacred story,” “historical narrative,” etc. What an anthropologist might re­
gard as a myth, can be regarded by members of the community as a narrative 
about, for example, some social divisions (cf. Mea Idei, 1952). It is nothing 
more and nothing less than that. In the Preface of her book (O’Flaherty, 1988), 
a distinguished scholar noted a Hindu’s reaction to her earlier work on Hindu 
myths: the very title of the book (Hindu Myths) was regarded as offensive!
According to Cohen (1969: 349),’’the fact that myths are narratives is of 
primary importance.” The same author saw this as the institution of the 
relationship between the present and the past. This relationship is essentially 
a static and one-sided one. Whenever it is necessary (or simply convenient), 
the past is being recalled. The argument here is somewhat different from 
the one presented by Eliade, who believed that the past is constantly being 
re-enacted in the present -  with numerous alterations, but with the basic 
structure remaining the same. However, Cohen’s argument is based on the 
experience of the “classical” Western tradition.37 An analysis based on
37. I am well aware of the potential criticism that my use o f this general term (and lumping 
together o f so many distinctive culture traditions within “the West”) might inspire, but I 
use this term here only as a means for illustrating my point.
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another type of tradition, like, for example, the one from Mesoamerica 
(Boskovic, 1989, 1995a) will produce different results, with instances both 
o f the past being “anchored” in the future and the future in the present. 
There are no simple solutions, and the more different cultures and societies 
we take into account, the more diverse the answers.
In order to achieve any understanding of the myths o f a specific culture 
or society, it is necessary to take the “linguistic” or “narrative turn,” to 
regard myths primarily as narratives, culture-specific of course, and to 
employ all the elements of the analysis of narratives to the analysis of 
myths. This type of approach has been discussed and criticized in an article 
by the Swedish anthropologist Goran Aijmer, who regards myth as a “ritual 
transported into the verbal sphere of life, where it may further develop into 
fiction and drama.” Therefore, “if we wish to understand myth and what 
myth is about [...] we must treat myth as ritual” (1987: 21-22). The words 
of Leach are well echoed in the last sentence of this article: “The nature of 
myth is the nature of ritual, and the nature of ritual is that of the cultural 
exploration o f possible worlds” (1987: 22). So despite this admirable 
attempt to reinstate the myth and ritual connection, we are again left with 
something as vague as “the cultural exploration of possible worlds.”
Myths are stories (traditional tales) that shares many narrative features 
with other types of stories (Todorov, 1981: 48-53). Myth as a story is 
always recorded in a certain way, as a narrative, and then edited as a part 
of a larger ensemble of cultural “texts.” This process of “editing” is of 
great importance, since it also means “translating” myths into another mode 
(medium or language). It cannot be avoided, but we should always bear 
in mind this intermediary function that an anthropologist/ethnographer 
performs.
Myths can be analysed and divided into smaller units (motifs), and the 
relationship of these motifs can then be examined. The narrative functions 
of myths can be examined in relation to other narratives (Barthes, 1988: 
98 ff). But is there any segment that myths possess and other narratives do 
not?
The answer to this question may sound surprising: there is none. There 
is nothing that myths possess and other stories (narratives) do not, so that 
when we first hear (or read) a myth from some culture (provided that we 
know the language reasonably well), we could immediately (and positively) 
identify it as a myth. It is the combination of all the different segments that
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matters, as well as the culture-specific rules. For example, Vladimir Propp 
wrote (and strongly influenced structuralists, discourse-analysts, and many 
others) about the “morphology of the folktale” (1958). However, had he 
been a Hopi and doing the same thing, his work would have been regarded 
as a piece on the “morphology of the myth.” Russian fairy-tales are not 
regarded as myths by Russians -  but they would be regarded by such in a 
culture significantly different from the Russian. Another example is the 
work of the Grimm brothers on the European peasants’ folklore, these days 
almost completely forgotten (that is to say, as far as anthropology is con­
cerned), and hardly anyone would regard the fairy-tales o f the European 
peasants as myths. However, if one would read a book like the Tsimshian 
Mythology and compare the Tsimshian myths with the Russian folktales or 
European fairy tales, the similarities are really striking.
Hence, there are no universal elements that define a myth.38 The quest 
for them might be interesting and entertaining, but essentially (as Socrates 
says in Phaedrus) a waste of time. Myths are traditional tales that are 
regarded as special in any specific cultures. They relate (by their structure, 
content, values they promote, or symbols associated with them) to certain 
deeply-embedded existential elements, and these elements are always 
culture-specific. They may be regarded in a similar way by other cultures 
(for example, we talk about the Gi;eek and Mesopotamian myths, but the Ara­
bian stories of the 1001 nights).
In proposing a “narrative turn” in the study of myths, I really do not 
think that I am advocating something very distinctive or radically new. The 
narrative approach has been attempted (with great success) in other fields, 
most notably in the “ethnography of communication” by Dell Hymes and 
the post-structuralist hermeneutics of Paul Ricceur.
In his article “The narrative turn” (originally published in 1979), Ricoeur 
distinguishes between two general types of narratives, historical and fictio­
nal.39 Both o f these types can be analysed in terms of the common 
structure (as done by French structuralists), or their historicity (since they 
refer “to the same fundamental feature of our individual and social existence”
38. And this is perhaps nicely implied in Lévi-Strauss’ Postscript to the Mythologiques.
39. In a very broad sense, the contrasted modes o f explanation and understanding can be 
applied to historical and fictional narratives, respectively. However, the meaningful
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[Ricceur, 1981: 274]). The “impossible logic” of narrative structures opens 
up another world. In Ricceur’s words:
Everything happens as if  the free play o f the imagination of mankind in its best 
storytellers had spontaneously created the intelligible forms on w hich our 
reflective judgment can in turn be applied, without having to impose possible 
stories. If that is the case, we could then paraphrase Kant’s famous formula about 
schematism and say: the narrative schematism ‘is an art hidden in the human soul, 
and it will always be difficult to extract the true mechanism from nature in order to 
lay it open before our eyes’. [1981: 287]
The very distinction between “history” and “fiction” is in itself 
fictional in many ways and many instances. Ricceur points to the role of 
the myth as mimesis (following the argument from the Aristotle’s Poetics), 
but this is a creative imitation (1981: 292-293), not a mere reflection of 
some “objective” reality. Through the process of this creative imitation, 
the world o f narratives (Ricoeur’s “the world of fiction”) brings us “ to 
the heart o f  the real world o f  action “ (p. 296). In conclusion, it seems 
that “fiction, by opening us to the unreal, leads us to what is essential in 
reality” {ibid.).
An attempt on the lines of the “narrative turn” was made by Greg Urban 
(1991). Urban claimed that anthropologists, if they want “to understand 
culture,” should “understand the properties of discourse that make it attrac­
tive” (1991: 102).40 Urban saw myth as a form of oral discourse. On the 
semantic level, it is not always clear how and in what way specific myths 
are different from other forms of discourse. Although he did present several 
examples of formal analyses in the best formalist/structuralist tradition, I do 
not find his insistence on binary oppositions very persuasive. Even though 
his book is about “native South American myths and rituals,” he makes no 
attempt to define ritual, or its specific place within the discourse(s) that he
explanation is impossible without at least some understanding, and understanding itself 
requires some explanation. The fictional narratives include “myths, folklore, legends, novels, 
epics, tragedies, drama, films, comic strips, etc.” (Ricceur, 1981: 281).
40. Urban defines discourse as “the means by which the past is kept alive in the present, by 
means o f which a culture is maintained” (1991: 17).
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analyses. There is a possibility that the act of speaking (when the final re­
sult is a myth) is in itself a form of ritual, but Urban does not elaborate on 
this. Nevertheless, I believe that the important new horizons lie behind this 
“discourse-centered” approach.
Although the study of narratives does include what is referred to as “the 
basic dichotomy” (Nõth, 1990: 369), story and discourse,41 this dichotomy 
involves a series of intermediary stages that depict the relationship of story 
and discourse. The danger of the “narrative approach” may lie in the over­
simplification of different concepts. While it is simple to regard everything 
as sets of binary oppositions, how much information (if any) can we get 
from that?
In a century after Smith, anthropologists have begun to approach myth 
from different angles. The connection between myth and ritual and the 
primacy of one or another has lost its importance (and structuralists deserve 
the credit for that). Smith deserves credit for stressing the social role and 
function o f religion and rituals, but he clearly underestimated the impor­
tance of myth. True, this underestimation should be regarded in the context 
of his own time and the barriers that he was crossing. This underestimation 
was dominating the anthropological research until the work of Lévi-Strauss.
The language o f myths is deeply embedded even into the contemporary 
structures of politics and power -  for example, the official US government 
discourse of the “Evil empire” fròm the 1980s. The more recent examples 
include postulating other ideologies or religions (like Islam) as the ultimate 
other (in the form of binary oppositions), as well as the sole remaining 
world superpower as the “guardian” of the principles of Good and Decency 
in the world (not unlike the fairy tales heroes). Finally, it is interesting to 
look at the examples of intertwining of myth and history in the Middle East 
(the Arab-Israeli conflict following the recognition of the independent Je­
wish state, in part as a recognition o f their claim to their sacred place o f  
origin), and in Southeastern Europe. In the latter case, both Serbs and Alba­
nians claim Kosovo/Kosova as their holy land. Both peoples believe that this 
area holds keys to their claims to statehood. In the Serbian case, most of the
41. Cf. Chatman: “A story is the content or chain o f events (actions, happenings), plus what 
may be called the existents (characters, items o f setting); and a discourse [...] is the ex­
pression, the means by which the content is communicated. In simple terms, the story is 
the what in a narrative that is depicted, discourse is the how" (quoted in Nõth, 1990: 369).
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medieval churches and monasteries are located at Kosovo, as well as the 
seat of the Serbian Orthodox Church Patriarchate. According to the myth, 
in 1389, the mediaeval Serb armies confronted the invasion of the Ottoman 
Turks at Kosovo. Most of the Serb nobles died in the battle and this heroic 
defeat is regarded in Serb traditional folklore as the result of the conscious 
choice of the Prince Lazar, who chose “the Kingdom in Heaven” over “the 
Kingdom on Earth.” Thus, even in their suffering and defeat, the Serbs 
stood higher than their victors. O f course, from the historical point of view, 
the claim that the battle ever took place is in some doubt. The Ottoman 
Turks did not actually gain control of Serbia until mid-15th century, and the 
leading Serbian historian of the period, Professor Sima Cirkovic, claims that 
the battle never took place. For the Albanians, who gradually became do­
minant population in the region following the mass exodus of Serbs after 
1690, the Kosova is sacred as well. Several very important battles against 
the Ottoman Turks were fought there in the first half of the 19,h century. 
The Prizren League was founded there in 1878, and many Albanians put 
their claim to national sovereignty from that date. Hence, it is easy to see 
how two mutually exclusive discourses (the Serb and the Albanian one) 
posit the same area as their mythical sacred space, as their (spiritual, histo­
rical and political) place o f origin, following the events that happened in a 
very distant past. It is also easy to see how Serbs can see all their suffering 
(including the most recent exodus from Kosovo in June 2000) as yet another 
spiritual victory, for once again choosing “the Kingdom in Heaven.” Wars 
in the mythical realms could never be definitively lost or won, they tend to 
perpetuate themselves as long as the myths exist.
In conclusion, the obvious fact that was self-evident for the ancient 
Greek philosophers is that all stories (myths included) are expressed by and 
through language (Plato’s Cratylus is just one example). Anthropologists 
have neglected this fact for a very long time. Many different theories have 
been advanced from different standpoints, but none has achieved any degree 
o f universality.'12 The reason for this is that none has operated with any­
42. Despite Lévi-Strauss’ claims for universality both he and his followers operate with (geo­
graphically and culturally) limited models. In order to be valid universally, these concepts 
should be applicable to other traditions (outside South America, outside Amerindian tradi­
tions), and they are not (see K irk’s criticism o f  the story o f  Asdiwal in Kirk, 1970; 
Mandelbaum, 1987 provides numerous references for criticisms of the (Edipus story, etc.).
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thing that is universal for all myths in all cultures and societies. An interes­
ting way o f interpreting myths (“mythology,” as the authors put it) using 
methods of analogy was proposed recently by Shelley and Thaggard (1996). 
They asked two crucial questions: “(a) In what way do members of a cul­
ture understand their myths? (b) In what way should researchers seek to 
understand myths?”, and answered: “in the same way” (1996: 179). This is 
a very interesting approach, but it falls into a trap of universalisation. The 
authors would still have to test this theoiy on some specific examples. Their 
interpretations of the Oedipus myth are interesting -  but what is their 
possible application in a context o f an actually existing society or culture? 
(Earlier scholars, like Malinowski, constructed their own theories, but then 
tested them in an actual context.) For example, it is very difficult to see 
how this theory could provide any insights in the aforementioned conflicting 
interpretations of the Kosovo/Kosova myth.
On the other hand, the narrative approach at least offers ways of exami­
ning the “facts” (and in particular, considering “facts” as culturally and 
socially constructed) of the actual ethnographic situations. As such, I think 
that it still presents the key to the interpretation of myths -  it is important 
to see who is telling them, in which context and to what purpose. Whether 
anthropologists will begin using this key is another question, to be answered 
in another narrative. Or should I say: another story.
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